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Brazil's International Development Cooperation:  
Old and New Motivations  
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Brazil has entered the world of development assistance provision, but with 
its own twist. This paper looks at what Brazil is doing in the provision of 
development assistance provision, arguing that despite protestations to the 
contrary, Brazil does provide ODA. The paper also argues that Brazil is 
taking a cross-government policy coherent approach to ODA, which 
includes recruitment of business interests. Turning to the motivations for 
providing foreign aid, the argument is that there is a genuine and deep 
concern with global poverty alleviation in Brazil, but that this does not 
preclude Brazilian policy makers from using aid and development-related 
activities from advancing the national interest. The added quirk that sets 
Brazil apart from Northern counterparts is that provision of development 
assistance offers significant benefits in terms of building internal 
international bureaucratic experience and helping national firms 
internationalize their market penetration and activities. 
 
One of the quiet activities supporting Brazil’s emergence as an important global 
player is its growing tendency to engage in substantive South-South technical 
cooperation activities. For Brazilian diplomats these activities represent 
cooperative ventures with other developing countries undertaken in partnerships 
that offer benefits for both parties. Framed in a policy context familiar to 
members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Brazil’s 
accelerating South-South cooperation activities look a lot like the provision of 
official development assistance (ODA) because they do involve a direct transfer 
of resources from the Brazilian state to the partner government, although the 
transferred resources are not in the form of cash. This represents a quandary for 
many DAC-member development agencies because although Brazil is joining 
their game, it is not part of their club and not a donor signature to their ODA 
governance frameworks. Matters are further complicated when attention is turned 
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to how Brazilian ODA is delivered, which differs markedly both in terms of 
project selection and delivery. 
 
For many governments and research institutions understanding what Brazil is 
doing in the field of development cooperation has become a priority, particularly 
when placed in the context of rising concern about the development assistance-
like activities of China and increasingly India (Bräutigam, 2009; Chin and Quadir, 
2013; Quadir, 2013; Rowlands, 2012; Saavedra, 2009, Samy, 2010; Shaw, Cooper 
and Chin, 2009; Stuenkel, 2010; Woods 2008). The result has been a series of 
studies outlining the scope and procedures of Brazilian ODA, with the survey by 
Brazil’s state-supported Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada standing as the 
most official Brazilian statement on budgetary questions (IPEA, 2010), although 
there are reports by other private and government research bodies (Cabral and 
Weinstock, 2010; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Inoue and Vaz, 2012; Milani and 
Carvalho, 2013; Pino, 2012; Pino and Leite, 2010; Stolte, 2012). Significantly less 
attention has been given to a serious examination of why the Brazilian 
government has increased the pace of its ODA provision and how it meshes with 
broader foreign policy and trade policy priorities (White, 2013; Burges, 2013).  
 
On a theoretical level little attention has been given to what implications Brazilian 
motivations for providing development assistance might have for our 
understanding of why states, and in particular emerging power states, engage in 
development cooperation activities. As this paper will argue, the Brazilian case 
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presents a twist on the established understandings of why ODA is provided, 
which may provide useful insight into foreign policy shifts in a number of 
emerging economies in the Americas and elsewhere. The foreign policy logic 
underpinning Brazilian development assistance provision does track closely with 
that found in DAC-member countries. Brazil’s twist is an integration of 
development assistance provision into larger plans for long-term domestic 
development and the internationalization of national firms. Brazil’s rhetoric of 
providing development assistance because it is the right thing to do is genuine, but 
does not trump national interest considerations. The shift in Brazil is an approach 
to national economic and social development that is predicated on an expanding 
and dynamic pan-Southern market.  Finally, the Brazilian case offers some 
practical lessons about the efficient use of funds and existing capacities for 
policy-makers in DAC-member agencies seeking to maintain programming in an 
era of fiscal restraint. 
 
The paper begins with a brief outline of the institutional structures and procedures 
governing Brazilian development assistance provision as well as an indication of 
the scale and nature of these activities. Attention is then turned to an examination 
of Brazilian motivations for giving foreign aid, using Hans Morgenthau’s seminal 
essay ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’ as a foil to guide the discussion. The 
paper concludes with a brief presentation of the implications that the Brazilian 
case holds for our understanding of why states provide foreign aid as well as 
lessons that aid bureaucrats might draw from an emerging power such as Brazil. 
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Research for this paper draws from a mixture of academic and policy papers, 
news reports, government documents and interviews with Brazilian government 
officials and international development and business officials in Brasília, Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo, New York, Washington, London, Ottawa, Canberra, and 
Maputo. 
 
What is Brazil doing and how is it doing it? 
The first point that must be clarified is one of terminology. Brazilian officials 
reject suggestions that they are providing official development assistance, 
preferring instead the term ‘technical cooperation’ and ‘South-South technical 
cooperation’. Terms such as aid, development assistance, and ODA are rejected 
because of their implicit notions of hierarchical relations. The importance of this 
distinction is not altogether surprising if we consider the yawning income gaps in 
Brazil between the extremely rich and the deeply impoverished. Moreover, the 
explicit and implicit discourse surrounding development assistance provision 
brings with it suggestions of (neo)colonialism and (neo)imperialism that neither 
fit with Brazil’s historical relations with other countries, nor match the official 
pattern of foreign relations being broadcast by the country’s foreign ministry, 
Itamaraty. These definitional niceties aside, the technical cooperation discussed in 
this paper does fall well within the bounds of DAC (2008) definitions of official 
development assistance and as will be further elaborated below, the procedures 
surrounding Brazil’s engagement with partner countries match important aspects 
of the development cooperation precepts espoused by the traditional donors. 
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The size and scale of what we might term Brazilian official development 
assistance is not large by DAC standards. An officially sponsored study into 
Brazilian resources directed towards development cooperation found a total 
expenditure of US$1.426 billion between 2005 and 2009. These funds were 
directed to four primary activities, with international organizations receiving 
US$1,082.2 million, scholarship programs US$138.8 million, humanitarian relief 
US$79.1 million and technical cooperation US$125.6 million. While all four of 
these areas fall within the DAC financial reporting definition of official 
development assistance, the one most commonly associated with ODA is 
technical cooperation. Significantly, this expenditure line had been growing 
quickly in Brazil, moving from US$11.4 million per annum in 2005 to US$48.9 
million in 2009, and encompassing over 400 projects in 58 different countries 
(IPEA, 2010: 21). Officials in Itamaraty remarked during interviews in late 2012 
that the ABC budget had experienced massive annual cuts during the first two 
years of the Dilma Rousseff presidency and that they were now having to refuse 
requests for technical cooperation assistance, particularly from the African 
countries that had been assiduously cultivated during the Lula presidency. 
 
Technical cooperation provided by Brazil is coordinated through the Agência de 
Cooperação Brasileira (ABC – Brazilian Cooperation Agency), the same agency 
that managed inward flows of development assistance from the DAC members. 
While legally part of Itamaraty and thus embedded within its budget, ABC has a 
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subtle degree of bureaucratic separation from its ministerial master. It is housed in 
a building that is within direct sight, but physically separate from the Itamaraty 
Palace complex. This measure of symbolic separation is emblematic of ABC’s 
relationship to the hierarchical and disciplined Itamaraty, leaving the Agency 
space to move at its own pace and inclination provided it does not contradict the 
goals of Brazilian foreign policy. Alignment is insured by having the Agency 
headed by a mid-career diplomat who must still report through the Itamaraty 
hierarchy for major decisions and return back to the ministry for future career 
advancement and postings.  
 
During the Lula presidency (2003-2010) ABC was headed by Marco Farani, then 
a diplomat of ‘ministro’ rank. Farani played a critical role not only in enlarging 
the size and budget of ABC, but also in increasing its international profile. His 
title ‘ministro’ was often taken literally by DAC-member agencies, who received 
Farani as a Brazilian government minister and sought to use ABC to build 
bilateral relations. In part the DAC-member agencies were enticed by Farani’s 
vision for ABC: a more formalized institutional existence, creation of a 
‘development officer’ career stream and an expansion of staffing and budget to 
look more like DAC counterparts. Dilma-era budget cuts and Farani’s subsequent 
posting as consul-general in Tokyo both point to a slowing of ABC’s activities.. 
An additional restraint on the potential autonomy of ABC are the Agency’s 
staffing procedures, which consist of a handful of diplomats and over 100 
contracted officials. A substantial number of the staff at ABC are paid through a 
 9 
circular movement of funds to the UNDP, which then hires contractors for ABC 
on terminal contracts to work around the Brazilian state’s employment regulations. 
The result is a quiet restraint on policy-setting autonomy at ABC and a careful 
retention of the Agency within the administrative bounds of the foreign ministry. 
The associated churn in staff retards institutional memory and the Agency’s 
capacity to develop an advanced policy planning capacity for its own activities 
and the sorts of country strategy frameworks found in DAC agencies. 
 
The staffing, budgetary and policy restraints placed upon ABC are reflective of 
the manner in which the Brazilian government conducts its development 
cooperation activities. Brazil purports to be completely responsive with its 
development cooperation provision, addressing specific requests from partners 
rather than proposing activities. Moreover, the responsive nature of ABC-
coordinated activities mean that ODA provision remains on an isolated project 
basis, not the larger program basis that DAC members use to align multiple 
projects towards a defined goal. Any sense that multiple Brazilian technical 
cooperation projects might be tied together is further diluted by how development 
cooperation is delivered. Rather than hiring outside consultants, the ABC mandate 
is to find agencies and departments within the Brazilian state that have the 
requested expertise and then coordinate the terms of reference for and delivery of 
a project. One of the objections expressed by officials in some DAC agencies is 
that this amounts to a form of tied aid because ABC does not tender its projects 
for public bidding. While there is definitely merit to this critique, and it is an issue 
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being addressed by NGO groupings in Brazil such as Articulação Sul, there is a 
critical difference between the Brazilian government and its Northern 
counterparts.  
 
In Brazil issues such as poverty reduction, microeconomic growth, education 
reform, public health expansion, and agrarian development are the central public 
policy problems preoccupying government, not questions for an often 
marginalized development agency struggling to maintain its budget and political 
position. Unlike the situation in Northern governments, the relevant and proven 
development expertise exists within the Brazilian state and its various agencies. 
Where Northern development agencies focus on devising and proposing ideas that 
might work, the approach found through ABC is an attempt to translate policies 
and programs that have worked in Brazil to a different political, economic and 
cultural context. This is reflected in the attitude of countries seeking assistance 
through ABC. As El Savlador’s vice minister of foreign affairs observed, 
‘Brazil’s programs work and therefore offer valuable lessons for other developing 
countries’ (Garcia, 2012). 
 
The use of Brazilian government employees for South-South technical 
cooperation programming creates a major disjuncture between ABC’s reported 
budget and the actual impact generated by its spending. The ABC covers the 
administrative costs of projects such as airfares and per diems, but the salary for 
an assigned Brazilian expert is absorbed by the individual’s home agency. The 
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cost of employing scientific and managerial staff to set up the series of 
experimental farms in Senegal and Mali was thus absorbed by the directing 
Brazilian agency EMPRAPA, not ABC. This approach of internal salary 
absorption by Brazilian state agencies when delivering ODA combines with the 
Agency’s limited evaluation and reporting systems to radically drive down the 
costs of providing programming. This suggests that the official estimate of 0.02% 
of GDP expenditure on development cooperation by Brazil is highly 
misrepresentative and the effective figure closer to at least 0.10%-0.15%. 
 
The understating of the impact of Brazilian development cooperation activities 
extends beyond measurement of the financial value of what the country does and 
the savings that are accrued from a much smaller coordinating agency. Brazilian 
activities in four other areas also make an important contribution to international 
development and in some respects are remarkably consistent with the ideas of a 
coherent whole-of-government approach to development captured by the Centre 
for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index.1 The first 
measure is use of export financing from the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (BNDES – National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development). Although required by its articles of incorporation to disburse only 
                                                
1 The Centre for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index gives 
seven areas of government policy equal weight and then comparatively ranks 
DAC-member countries on the extent to which their overall governmental policy 
is conducive to facilitating international development. The seven policy areas are 
aid, trade, investment, migration, environment, technology and security. More 
detail on the CDI can be found at: 
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/. 
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funds that directly benefit Brazilian firms and citizens, the previous understanding 
that this meant only spending money in Brazil has been broadened by arguing that 
the export of professional services and the financing of outward Brazilian FDI is 
consonant with the Bank’s mandate. The BNDES has consequently become an 
important source of financing for infrastructure projects in Latin America and 
increasingly in Africa, offering interest rates and terms not available to partner 
governments otherwise forced to use global financial markets. Although 
announced sums are often impressive, funds actually dispersed are much smaller 
(Hochstetler and Montero, forthcoming). 
 
While not satisfying the DAC rules on concessional financing and thus not 
eligible for consideration as ODA, BNDES financing nevertheless represents a 
significant savings for the recipient and sometimes allows the pursuit of 
infrastructure projects that would otherwise be impossible. For Lula the logic was 
quite simple, captured in his quip that ‘Brazil cannot deport itself as a small 
country.’ The BNDES responded with financing lines to reduce regional 
asymmetries and boost the physical integration links between Bolivia, Paraguay 
and Uruguay (Leo, 2007). What Brazil did not entirely bargain for was potential 
blowback due to lacunae in planning and approval processes as well as 
commercial disputes between foreign governments and Brazilian contractors. For 
example, in 2011 serious indigenous protests erupted in Bolivia over attempts to 
build a BNDES-financed road through a remote border area (Murakawa, 2011). 
There were also disputes in Ecuador and Peru revolving around disagreements 
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with contractors and planning process that enmeshed Brazilian-provided financing 
in internal and commercial disputes. While sometimes rowdy, there does seem to 
be a distinction between the financing and the actual source of the conflict. Indeed, 
one of the most problematic cases involving BNDES-financed infrastructure, the 
San Francisco dam project in Ecuador (Marcelino, 2008), did not prevent 
president Rafael Correa willingly looking to Brazil for additional financing in 
2012 (Marcelino, 2012). 
 
The second element is a process called competitive import substitution, which 
sees the Brazilian state encouraging a redirection of trade to bring comparable 
products in from other developing countries rather than from the North. An 
additional stream of this policy directly tackles the horrific conditions experienced 
by migrant Bolivian textile workers stuck in São Paulo sweatshops, encouraging 
production to be relocated to the neighbouring country. While both initiatives 
remain in the process of being fully implemented, each draws on some of the 
strategic political imperatives set out during the Cardoso presidency and further 
advanced during the Lula years through the idea of a new economic geography. 
Established precedents for this program can be found in the decision in the late 
1980s to reorient energy sourcing towards South America to belay the deleterious 
political impact of consistent regional trade surpluses. In its wider contemporary 
manifestation the idea is to draw on the Brazilian government’s detailed line-item 
database of imports to act as matchmaker between firms in Brazil and potential 
alternate suppliers in countries such as Bolivia, Peru or Ecuador.  
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This idea of relocating production sites and competitive import substitution is 
reinforced by the third and fourth elements of Brazil’s cross-government pro-
development policies. In the third element deliberate use is made of the large 
Brazilian multinational corporations that the state either directly controls through 
a substantial ownership stake such as Vale, Petrobras and Eletrobras, or is able to 
heavily influence by controlling access to the more affordably priced financing of 
the BNDES, i.e., Eike Battista’s EBX group or the construction and engineering 
empreiteiras such as Odebrecht, Quiroz Galvão, Camargo Correa and Andrade 
Gutierrez. While not able to impose investments decisions that run counter to 
good business sense, government pressure has resulted in strategic reorientations 
that have prompted entry into markets in Latin America and Africa that might 
otherwise have been ignored. In this vein Brazilian exports to Africa climbed 
from US$2.3 billion in 2002 to US$12.2 billion by 2011. Imports followed a 
similar trajectory, going from US$2.7 billion in 2002 to US$15.4 billion in 2011 
(INTAL, 2012). These new ventures are further bolstered by political support as a 
door opener (Chade, 2006; Saraiva, 2012; Dávila, 2010), which can also include 
the use of Brazilian culture and ODA as fertilizer to create a fertile investment 
climate. Brazilian-led groupings such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking 
Nations (CPLP) have been used in this manner to set the stage for major 
investment actions such as Vale’s US$6 billion Moatize coalmine expansion in 
Mozambique and Petrobras oil investment in Guinea Bissau (Flak, 2011; 
Macauhub.com.mo, 2006). More recently Brazilian construction companies have 
 15 
toured Lula through Africa and Latin America to help with access to upcoming 
infrastructure tenders (Carneiro de Mendonça, 2012; Scherer, 2012). 
 
The fourth element reinforces this, with Brazilian efforts to contribute to new 
international efforts such as the IBSA Fund for development through the UNDP 
(Vieira, 2013), the Banco do Sul, and the mooted BRIC Bank alternative to the 
World Bank (Quadir, 2013). While modest in scale – the IBSA fund receives only 
a million dollars in capital from India, Brazil and South Africa each year – these 
nascent institutions do demonstrate a conscious effort to create alternate 
frameworks to encourage development across the South. The IBSA fund is 
explicit that it seeks to multiply the impact of its programming by creating 
capacity and a legacy of sustainable outcomes. The Banco do Sul, or Bank of the 
South, started as a Hugo Chávez idea that gradually was pushed by Brazil’s 
finance ministry from being an almost ideologically-oriented anti-capitalist 
project to a more orthodox institution that if fully established could help with 
balance of payments issues and the funding of regional infrastructure projects. 
The notional BRIC bank fits into a similar frame as the Banco do Sul, bringing 
together Brazil, Russia, India and China to create a development-financing 
alternative to the World Bank group and thus not dominated by the US and 
Europe (Webber and Mander, 2011; Economic Times, 2012; Ranganathan, 2012). 
Moreover, the BRIC bank would open financing for infrastructure projects in 
Africa that currently cannot be pursued under existing World Bank and IMF 
conditionalities. In both instances the idea behind the banks may prove more 
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important than their eventual potential to manage balance of payment crises or 
finance development. Each points to active involvement in an approach deeply 
questioning of established Bretton Woods Institution power relations and a 
willingness to search out alternatives that will provide Brazil with an entry point 
to emerging market areas that have previously been almost exclusively occupied 
by the North.  
 
Why Provide ODA? 
The question that remains unanswered is why Brazil is now engaging in the 
provision of ODA and whether the rationale is any different than that of the 
existing donors. On one level the larger questions of why countries give foreign 
assistance are as applicable to the Brazilian case as to members of the DAC. 
Ruttan (1989) echoes and condenses Mason’s (1964) earlier work by categorizing 
the various motivations for ODA provision into two broad sets of arguments: 
those based on the economic and security self-interests of the donor country; and 
those based on the moral and ethical responsibility of the donor country. As will 
be set out, both apply to the Brazilian case, with Lula administration officials 
going so far as to build elements of their country’s foreign policy and 
international identity around a responsibility to ensure that the rest of the global 
South progresses with Brazil, albeit as much for market growth reasons as 
genuine concerns with human development. The blending of these two 
motivations, which Ruttan acknowledges, points to an additional element of 
foreign aid as an attractive policy tool, which is that it is relatively benign and 
 17 
flexible, relying heavily on public relations as well as the strengthening of 
diplomatic relations (Grant and Nijman, 1998). For Brazil this is particularly 
attractive and fits with its self-image of a non-interventionist country dedicated to 
finding positive outcomes to international challenges. An added attraction is the 
high symbolic importance that a relatively small commitment can have for 
decision-makers in the recipient country.  
 
In order to give a more detailed explanation of why a state might give foreign aid, 
Black (1968) sets out four broad policy categories. The first three correspond 
directly to the interest-driven aspects of foreign policy by focusing on defense, 
economic and political reasons. Arguably, his fourth rationale – humanitarianism 
– overarches these three if we turn our attention to the impact that mass tragedy 
can have on regional political economies. As a classificatory system these four 
criteria allow us to make quick attributions of why ODA is given, but they do not 
provide much avenue for explaining the activity in more detail. To do this it is 
more useful to turn to Morgenthau’s 1962 article ‘A Political Theory of Foreign 
Aid’, where he sets out six types of foreign aid: 
 
1) Humanitarian foreign aid – an ostensibly non-political form of aid 
that is designed to provide immediate relief to a country finding itself 
in a state of crisis that threatens immediate and widespread tragedy for 
the population. The goal is to prevent the breakdown of order and the 
rise of situations resembling a failed state. 
 18 
2) Subsistence foreign aid – foreign aid extended to governments that do 
not possess the resources necessary to maintain a minimal level of 
public services. Again, the ambition is to ensure that societal order 
does not breakdown and lead to a failed state. Unlike humanitarian aid, 
which can be blind to the regime in power in a given country, 
subsistence foreign aid has an explicit element of maintaining the 
status quo.  
3) Military aid – the dominant form of foreign aid in the 1950s, and 
arguably a critical part of US foreign aid provision to parts of the 
Middle East and Latin America (especially Colombia), it traditionally 
involves the direct transfer of military capacity in the form of materials 
and training to buttress alliances.  
4) Bribery – foreign aid is provided as a device for securing the 
compliance from another government and ensuring that it backs the 
donor’s initiatives and priorities. Morgenthau is clear that this is not a 
particularly new idea in international politics, but that the repackaging 
of it in the guise of providing humanistic assistance is an evolution 
new to the post-World War Two era.  
5) Prestige – The objective is to provide a symbolic sign that the 
receiving country has achieved a higher level of development as 
manifest through the unprofitable steel mill or shiny new sports stadia 
that the donor has funded. Efforts are focused very much on advancing 
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the prestige of the recipient government in order to secure linkages 
between its ruling elite to the donor government. 
6) Foreign aid for economic development – resources are transferred to 
the recipient state with the explicit goal of inciting economic growth 
and diversification in a sustainable manner that will in turn promote 
higher levels of human development and fuller integration into the 
global system. 
 
Clearly, the thinking underpinning the global development assistance system has 
moved significantly since Morgenthau’s political theory of foreign aid was 
published in 1962. Approaches to development have shifted comprehensively 
away from his focus on economic growth to the more holistic and all-
encompassing notion of human development, which places as much emphasis on 
capacity building and governance as it does on economic growth and physical 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, the six ‘types’ of aid presented by Morgenthau 
continue to resonate with the underpinning logic of ODA today. Humanitarian 
and subsistence aid remain important for crisis-torn areas recovering from 
traumas such as natural disaster and civil war. Although military aid is explicitly 
excluded by DAC reporting regulations from calculations of a country’s ODA 
contributions, the provision or withholding of military aid remains a powerful 
foreign policy tool for countries such as the US, Russia and China, and latterly 
even Brazil (Monteiro, 2008). The language around the bribery aspect of ODA 
provision may have softened further from that seen in the 1960s and moved away 
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from alliance and allegiance towards broad systemic questions such as market 
economics and democratization as set out in some of the critical ODA literature, 
but it still remains a powerful factor in attempts to discipline the actions of 
recalcitrant developing countries (Peet, 2003). Prestige aid has arguably been 
foresworn by much of the DAC membership beyond the act of sending assistance, 
but remains a central device for major emerging donors such as China, India and 
the Gulf States that continue to engage in big projects like constructing stadium 
and congress buildings. The final category, aid for economic development, is the 
major concern of the traditional donors even if the raw focus on the economy has 
expanded to include critical supporting areas such as health, human capital and 
governance.  
 
The resonance that Morgenthau’s work retains for the provision of ODA is largely 
predicated on a common set of interest preoccupations shared by the DAC 
members. While there is a genuine concern with advancing human development, 
this is not as dominant as the altruistic might hope. Indeed, there is a substantial 
body of work that suggests that the preoccupation with aid is itself a problem for 
development (Easterly, 2006; Moyo 2009). In part this is because development is 
only one part of the decision-making calculation, with the other variables being 
considerations such as the opening of emerging markets, the securing of access to 
raw materials, the cementing of political allegiances, and the spread of a global 
ideology and governance framework conducive to continued economic expansion 
of the North. All of these drivers come from economies that are already in a 
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position of internationalized, advanced socio-economic development. By turning 
to the Brazilian case we can ask what changes if we look at the provision of ODA 
from the perspective of a country that is still working through the challenges of 
development. Phrased another way, the question is: how does the provision of 
ODA advance the domestic development of the providing state? As will be argued 
in the next section, questions of national interest remain preeminent in Brazil’s 
decision-making matrix, but the underlying domestic issues that need to be 
addressed create different motivations for providing development assistance and 
different reactions from the partner countries. 
 
The Brazil End – What has stayed the same? 
Brazil does subscribe to some of the established patterns of development 
assistance provision, most obviously in the realm of humanitarian assistance. 
During the 2005-2009 period Brazil provided R$155.3 million in direct 
humanitarian assistance (IPEA, 2010: 22). The earthquake in Haiti prompted a 
rapid acceleration in humanitarian activities, with Brazil quickly announcing 
US$15 million in assistance shortly after the disaster and then moving the sum up 
to a total of US$28.9 million for the island in 2010, mostly delivered through 
various UN organizations. This concentration of aid flows through international 
organizations fits the trend in Brazilian giving, which has multilateralized its 
contributions rather than engaging in bilateral assistance. Most grants have been 
in the US$200,000-300,000 range. Of more direct bearing on the subject of this 
paper is the official line from Itamaraty on humanitarian assistance: ‘the increase 
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in resources destined for international humanitarian assistance happened, in part, 
through a determination by president Lula that Brazil must assume its 
international responsibilities for the guarantee of human rights, including 
humanitarian assistance’ (Amato, 2010). Engaging in humanitarian assistance 
thus becomes important not only for the prestige reason of showing that Brazil is 
not an impoverished country, but also for the larger foreign policy reason of 
staking a direct claim to a seat at major global governance tables (Burges, 2013).  
 
Brazil’s major engagement with Haiti is a particularly important example of 
humanitarian assistance supporting foreign policy priorities. Taking charge of the 
Minustah mission in Haiti offered Brazil an opportunity to tangibly demonstrate 
its commitment to international security and the advancement of global 
governance structures, all of which gave credence to the larger political 
imperative of Brazilian ambitions for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. An additional element was a desire to build Brazilian legitimacy as a 
regional manager that could nudge the US and Canada out of Latin American and 
Caribbean affairs. These competing priorities – provision of humanitarian 
assistance and the advancement of foreign policy goals – created an important 
contradiction in the delivery and management of assistance to Haiti. Tensions 
were clear in the North-South dimension of Brazil’s Minustah leadership, with 
one ranking Brazilian official writing of the conflict between Northern desires for 
decisive military interventions versus the slower ‘hearts and mind’ approach 
implemented by Brazil (Braga, 2010). Celso Amorim (2011) was even more 
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direct, titling the Haiti chapter of his memoires as foreign minister: ‘The Brazilian 
armed forces do not fire on the people.’  
 
Where it might be expected that Brazil had an interest in concretely advancing 
effective multilateralized South-South cooperation to help the island nation, 
progress seemed haulting as contesting approaches to development from 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile clashed. This is not to say that results were not 
achieved, but rather that the South-South option in Haiti proved no better than the 
previous North-South approach.  Feldman, et al. (2011) offer four main reasons 
for this disappointment. First, the Minustah countries – Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile – have different philosophical approaches to development, which impacts 
how they conceptualize. Second, historical rivalries amongst the ABC countries 
crept through in the form of a competitive spirit in Haiti. Third, the three countries 
had different interests on the ground, particularly with respect to how their role in 
Minustah impacted their country’s global position. Finally, national conceptions 
of and commitments to peace building and its relation to larger ODA governance 
frameworks differed; Chile is an OECD member whereas Argentina and Brazil 
are not.   
 
Less prominent and poorly quantified has been the provision of subsistence 
foreign aid. Beyond assistance provided through organizations such as the World 
Food Program and Food and Agriculture Organization, activities in this area are 
far more localized to Brazilian territory than the post-earthquake Haiti case 
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suggests. A major part of Brazilian assistance in this area is quietly implicit, with 
the government deliberately turning a blind eye to the use of its education and 
health care services by foreign nationals in communities along Brazil’s borders. 
Foreign policy priorities still have an important role in this approach. There is a 
significant security imperative at play because these border regions are marked by 
a fluid movement of people across the frontier, which also brings the threat of 
transnationalized health issues and criminality. While not massive in scale, 
allowing ‘leakage’ of Brazilian services in these regions helps provide some 
stability by providing social services that may not otherwise be available to 
residents in the frontier regions of Paraguay, Bolivia, Guyana or Suriname.  
 
Military and prestige aid in the traditional sense are less apparent in the panoply 
of Brazilian South-South cooperation. The quantity and nature of the resources 
available to Brazil simply do not allow for the expansive, prestige projects that 
formerly marked DAC aid and remain a high profile part of development 
assistance coming from China and India. Similar restrictions are found in the 
realm of military aid, with direct material assistance being very much the 
exception, although there is an active program of advanced officer training, 
including training the Namibian navy to the point that it operates in Portuguese, 
and increasing cooperation on policing operations. Although still nascent in form, 
the provisions found within Brazil’s 2008 Política de Defesa Nacional clearly set 
out a plan for a pan-South American security framework that would de facto be 
driven by Brazil and include a degree of interoperability that would seem to 
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require active direct support from Brazilian forces. Nevertheless, there are clear 
signs that Brazil has been seeking to increase the military assistance and arms 
sales it provides to sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Bay of Guinea where 
there might be important oil opportunities for Petrobras (Coelho, 2010).  
 
For the most part the clear focus in Brazil’s South-South technical cooperation 
has been on what Morgenthau termed ‘foreign aid for economic growth’, which 
might usefully be translated into contemporary parlance as ‘assistance for human 
development’. What sets Brazil apart in this area is a very soft power focus on 
knowledge and capacity transfer in response to specific requests instead of the 
parachuting in of individual projects that may not be reflective of recipient desires 
or needs. The focus is very much on the temporary transfer of government 
personnel to directly share technical knowledge held within the Brazilian state 
based on existing and effective programs. Outside contractors and consultants are 
not hired. The focus on state capacity for the delivery of this work is evident in 
the areas where ABC has been most active, with 22% of assistance going to 
agricultural programming, 16.6% to health projects, 12.6% to education, 11.8% to 
public administration and security and 7.5% to environmental issues (Cabral and 
Weinstock, 2010: 6). To advance projects in these policy areas ABC draws on the 
specific expertise of state-run organizations such as EMBRAPA (agriculture), 
IBAMA (environment), Fiocruz (health), and Senai and Senalc (employment 
training and administration).  
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One thing that is immediately apparent after a deeper examination of Brazil-
provided ODA is that it tightly subscribes to the interest-advancing imperatives 
that often mark DAC assistance provision. Just as Australia engaged in a 
mammoth expansion of ODA to underwrite its efforts to win a UNSC seat in 2010, 
the Brazilian government has not shied away from the use of South-South 
technical cooperation to underwrite its foreign policy and foreign economic 
agenda, particularly to retain African support within the UN system. This is 
immediately apparent if we look at the distribution of Brazilian assistance, with 
South America receiving 23%, Central America and the Caribbean 12% and 
Africa 50%, focused tightly on the Lusophone countries. These regional 
distributions align almost exactly with the travels of Lula, who made twelve trips 
to Africa and visited 21 countries as well as hosting a series of summits in Brazil. 
The clear impetus for Lula was to give Africa a more central place in Brazil’s 
international political and economic engagement both to support the rise of 
Brazilian global leadership and open new opportunities for the country’s firms 
(White, 2010). Similar concerns drove engagement with South and Latin America, 
where Lula’s foreign policy team was working to entrench Brazil’s quiet 
leadership and preeminence in the region (Burges, 2009: chapter six). 
 
The intra-governmental critique of the expansion of Brazil’s foreign aid stems 
from its totally responsive nature, which in turn means that it is not guided by an 
overarching strategy or sense of program or policy priorities. In interviews in 
Brasília some diplomats and officials in other internationally oriented ministries 
 27 
observed that their country’s foreign aid projects were almost being given as 
greeting gifts during Lula’s travels throughout Africa or when the president 
received visiting presidents and ranking officials. This sort of observation is 
supported by a survey of the projects catalogued in the ABC publication A 
Cooperação Técnica do Brasil para a África, which outlines a long succession of 
very specific projects such as the transfers of conditional cash transfer 
methodology (Benin), survey missions to development technical cooperation 
projects (Burkina-Faso), cacao management programs (Cameroon), capacity 
building advice for agronomists (Nigeria), or assistance with the expansion of 
Eucalyptus plantations (Tunisia) (ABC, n.d.). Where a country is small and of 
relatively minor trade, investment, or political importance to Brazil, the listing of 
works underway or planned is also small. The number of planned and 
implemented projects mushrooms and grows in complexity – creation of 
experimental farm systems (Ghana, Cameroon, Mozambique), reform of national 
health systems (Namibia, Angola), educational systems (Angola, Mozambique), 
and anti-HIV programming (Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria)  – when the recipient 
country is either a member of the CPLP or of potentially major economic and 
political significance such as Nigeria or Ghana. 
  
Although in keeping with Morgenthau’s arguments that ODA ties the recipient to 
the donor, the scale of Brazil’s aid requires a more nuanced reading. Rather than 
creating a near-dependency link, Brazil’s South-South technical cooperation 
works more as an important door opener and gesture of goodwill to give rapid 
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substance to the country’s South-South foreign policy. More to the point, the 
nature of the assistance provided by Brazil differs markedly from that coming 
from the DAC members or other emerging donors such as China, focusing 
squarely on the transfer of proven administrative and technical approaches to 
shared developmental problems. Both the smaller scale and the actual operating 
nature drawing from live programs in Brazil that formed the core of the assistance 
delivered through ABC thus carried greater resonance and pointed more firmly 
towards the idea of partnership than some competing approaches. For countries 
such as El Salvador the horizontal nature of South-South technical cooperation 
and the fact of Brazil’s successes in addressing poverty make Brazilian 
programming highly attractive. The emphasis on skills transfer as opposed to 
financial assistance is seen as providing a new dimension in development 
assistance that is perceived as carrying a new and potentially greater potential for 
achieving lasting developmental results (Garcia, 2012).  
The focus on a more subtle process of building lasting relationships predicated on 
local capacity development is echoed in the approach that Brazilian firms are 
taking in Africa; in some countries regulations limiting expat employment create 
additional motivation. Brazilian firms appear to be committed to using local 
labour and at least attempting to develop local managerial skill with a view to a 
long-term in-country investment. For example, the general manager of corporate 
affairs for Vale Mozambique is a Mozambican national; in a similar context 
managers at Odebrecht, which employs over 20,000 in Angola and thousands 
more in Mozambique, talk of the challenges they face in retaining ambitious 
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junior staff leaving to start their own businesses. Conversely, there are frequent 
complains around Vale’s Moatize mine in Mozambique that not enough good jobs 
are being created for locals. Nevertheless, the approach of Brazilian firms  stands 
in sharp distinction to practices often attributed to countries like China or the 
DAC-members, which are accused of what amounts to strip mining of resources 
and leaving little positive legacy (Kermeliotis, 2012).  
 
The challenge facing Brazilian firms professing a long view is that the human 
capital and domestic supply chains that they need may not exist (Peres, 2013). 
While it is a stretch to suggest that Brazilian ODA is directly driven by companies 
such as Vale or Odebrecht, the technical assistance coordinated by ABC helps 
create the conditions they need to pursue their in-country strategy. One example is 
Embrapa’s ProSavana program Mozambique. Beginning with the observation that 
the climate and soil in Mozambique are similar to Brazil, Embrapa has been 
exploring how integrated agro-industrial systems might be set up. For Odebrecht 
this represents an opportunity to diversify activities beyond civil engineering. 
Vale has taken an interest in the project as a parallel development hub around its 
Moatize mine, looking to ProSavana as avenue for the locally-sourcing food 
supplies and expanding its long-term development impact on region. 
 
While not designed to be exclusive to Brazilian investors – ProSavana is a 
trilateral project with Japan – the underlying reality is that the initiative is pursued 
and presented in Portuguese. The importance of language as a source of relational 
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power should not be underestimated for the Brazilian-interest advancing aspects 
of ODA activities in Lusophone Africa. As Mozambique’s minister for natural 
resources observed: ‘Brazil has an advantage by speaking Portuguese, but its 
firms face the same conditions as any other company’ (Bias, 2013). This filters 
through into other areas of ODA-like activities that support Brazilian firms. 
Capacity building, particularly the provision of advanced professional and 
technical training in Brazil is held up by Mozambique’s foreign minister as an 
important contributor to development human capital development (Baloi, 2013). 
While these factors all combine to create a positive disposition towards Brazil, 
officials in the Finance Ministry are clear that in the end Brazil is seen as any 
other external actor such as China, Spain or South Africa. The two factors that set 
Brazil apart from other countries seeking entry into Mozambique and other 
Lusophone countries in Africa are the ease with which Brazilian firms operate due 
to their native fluency in Portuguese and Lusophone cultural norms, and the quiet 
colonization of the national elites through scholarship programs that bears a 
striking resemblance to the soft power of programs such as the British Council’s 
Chevenning scholarship program or the US Fullbright scheme. As Odebrecht’s 
Mozambique managing director explains, he turns to Brazilian programming 
because that is what he knows, a tendency which Brazil’s quiet ODA activity 
spreads through the national elite in the partner country.  
 
Surging bilateral trade with the South has been supported by government 
financing programs, including Africa-specific export-import credit lines with the 
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BNDES (OESP, 2012), which aligns with the Dilma government’s decision to 
maintain a focus on building engagement with the continent (Leo, 2011) even if it 
is now to be lead by the corporate sector and not the government (Peres, 2013). 
The feedback from some of the Brazilian empreiteiras working in Africa is that 
their more locally inclusive approach to project management and execution helps 
them win business away from international competitors. More to the point, these 
same Brazilian firms are increasingly finding themselves courted by Chinese 
companies looking to rebuild reputations or gain new contracts, particularly in the 
infrastructure development sectors. These construction companies do not overplay 
the importance of Brazilian ODA or BNDES financing for their presence in the 
region, pointing instead to the entry of long-term partners like Vale and Petrobras. 
Where the BNDES financing becomes significant id for state-driven infrastructure 
projects. Here the firm works closely with the tendering government to complete 
the finance application for a BNDES project loan. A construction bonanza is 
restrained by the commercial status that these loans are given by the IMF and 
World Bank, and thus subject to commercial debt limits under IFI conditionalities. 
But when a bid is arranged, ODA and the legacy of Lula’s turn to the South is 
used to gain access and close deals (Carneiro de Mendonça, 2012; Scherer, 2012). 
Security considerations are one factor that is almost totally absent from the 
existing literature on Brazil’s growing ODA portfolio. On an immediate basis this 
makes sense. War in South America is very unlikely and developmental levels are 
not radically different if we take issues of national inequality throughout the 
region into account. For senior Brazilian policy makers the worry is what will 
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happen in the future, particularly if Brazil continues to grow steadily and outpace 
human development improvements in neighbouring countries such as Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Guyana and Suriname. As they argue, if disparate levels of national 
economic development create a push-factor on illicit migration flows, imagine the 
challenges Brazil will face if it has to patrol illegal people trafficking along its 
vast, forested land-borders? In some respects this very problem has already 
arrived in the shape of a substantial group of Bolivians working as illegal textile 
workers in São Paulo and the rising flows of illicit Haitian immigration. Efforts 
are being made to relocate these textile productions centres to Bolivia through the 
competitive import-substitution program. The worry for policy planners is that 
Brazil will be seen as a new ‘USA’, with plenty of opportunity for undocumented 
workers, which is partially what is driving the flow of Haitians slipping into the 
state of Acre after transiting through Bolivia (Carvalho, 2012). 
 
The Brazil End – What has changed? 
Brazil’s different domestic context for the provision of development assistance 
suggest that there could be a number of factors at play in the decision to provide 
South-South technical cooperation that are not captured by the current thinking on 
why states give aid. On a foreign policy level the very factors that prompt many 
DAC members to give aid as a moral responsibility are working on Brazil to draw 
it into the game as a sign it belongs at the top global governance tables. This 
involves a twist on the ‘prestige’ rationale set out by Morgenthau, with Brazil 
providing foreign aid as a sign that it is no longer a developing country, but an 
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emerging power (Muggah and Hamann, 2012: 4). There is also a conscious desire 
to build soft power by showing the world how successful Brazil has been at 
combating poverty and export these programs to the rest of the world as an 
example to be followed. This is particularly the case with Brazilian social 
programs beyond the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Familia, including 
other initiatives such as the National Food Acquisition Program (Programa de 
Aquisição de Alimentos) and the National School Meals Program (Programa 
Nacional de Alimentação Escolar) (Itamaraty, n.d.).  
 
Ambitions to export Brazilian approaches to public policy problems bears an 
uncomfortable similarity to the sorts of expansionist and dependence-creating 
logic that helped support the rise of ODA programming in many DAC-member 
countries. The difference in Brazil is that combatting poverty is the prime public 
policy problem, not an activity pursued because it also offers important collateral 
political gains at home and abroad. This logic appeared repeatedly throughout the 
Lula years. Indeed, Lula’s personal political rise and success rested to a large 
extent on his real commitment to and success in ‘fighting hunger’ in Brazil. This 
was reflected on an international level by his donation of the 2003 Prince of 
Asturias prize award to the UN Hunger Fund that Brazil helped establish and 
which emerged as an important foundation stone for the rise of Brazilian 
development assistance provision. The pattern continued through the inclusion of 
the UNDP-administered IBSA Fund as a symbolically rich element of the new 
pattern of South-South cooperation found in the India-Brazil-South Africa 
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Dialogue Forum (Vieira, 2013). More recent efforts to direct the Banco do Sul in 
South America and the floating of the BRIC Bank parallel to the World Bank 
point to an effort to create new development institutions based in and financed by 
the South with Brazil at the lead. Beyond shifting the global development 
discourse to the South lies a particular commercial imperative for Brazil, which 
would see funds from the BRIC Bank and the Banco do Sul used to contract 
Brazilian construction firms for infrastructure.  
 
The prestige element of these activities is captured in the idea of global social 
citizenship that is a founding ideological strut of Brazil’s South-South foreign 
policy. Underpinning this is a very real self-interested economic agenda; the turn 
to the South and a new international economic geography has resulted in a 
cornucopia of new opportunities for Brazilian economic actors (White, 2013) 
even if the project is supported by a rhetoric of ensuring that the South develops 
as a unit. Still, on a straightforward economic interest level level this makes some 
sense for Brazil given that its value-added exports primarily go to the South and 
not the North. Latin America and the Caribbean is a critical export market for 
Brazil’s value addeds, absorbing US$33.5 billion of sales from Brazil in 2012, up 
from US$27.8 billion in 2008. The situation in Africa is similar, but more marked 
by agricultural exports. Value added exports peaked at US$3.674 billion in 2009, 
but retreated to US$2.627 billion by 2012, bringing this category down from 36.5 
percent of Brazil’s exports to Africa to 21.5%. But, this decline was paralleled by 
a surge in agricultural exports, which rose from US$2.979 billion in 2008 to 
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US$7.681 billion in 2012.2 In this context ODA provision takes on an important 
element of the market development process essential for a Brazilian domestic 
growth strategy predicated on continued expansion of other Southern economies.  
 
Like its counterparts in the North, Brazil is engaging in ODA provision to 
advance its economic interests, but in a more amplified manner that points to the 
use of South-South cooperation as a major contributor to larger developmental 
patterns. One area which is not terribly divergent from that seen in the North is 
the use of ODA programming to encourage the implementation of technical 
standards that then become a global norm. Two areas where this is taking place 
are biofuel ethanol, which forms an important part of the agricultural and energy 
programming being advanced through ABC-coordinated projects. The other is in 
the realm of digital television, where Brazil is pushing for global adoption of the 
ISDB-T International (SBTVD) as the international standard for digital television 
in the face of competition from two other competing formats.  
 
Another important developmental goal advanced in Brazil through ABC’s 
provision of ODA is the deepening of international expertise and experience 
within a number of state organizations. As has been noted by Daudelin in the 
Canadian context, international policy in a government’s line departments does 
                                                
2 Data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s DataIntal database. 
Searchers were at the one digit harmonized code level, with chapters 6-9 being 
aggregated to form the value added exports number and chapter 1 used for 
agricultural exports. [http://www.iadb.org/es/intal/estadisticas-de-
comercio,7585.html] 
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not require direct involvement or even participation from the foreign ministry 
(Daudelin, 2005). This becomes even more the case as international bureaucratic 
interactions move into increasingly technical discussions that become very 
specific to a discrete policy area with little clear impact beyond the acting 
ministry, i.e., phytosanitary standards and monitoring in the export of frozen 
chicken pieces. In the Brazilian context this presents a bit of a challenge for many 
ministries because the inward concentration of the state means that most lack a 
cadre of officials and technocrats with cross-cultural or international experience. 
The Brazilian approach to ODA of sending state-agency experts overseas to 
engage in the direct provision of technical assistance helps build the pool of 
international experience. This in turn is expanding the policy areas and actors 
actively involved in foreign policy outside of the oversight of the foreign ministry 
(Pinheiro and Milani, 2012). 
 
The provision of ODA thus offers Brazil an opportunity to develop its 
international capacity through a process of learning by doing. As was the case 
with Mercosur and the internationalization of Brazilian business, ABC-
coordinated activities act as a sort of incubator that allows a measured insertion 
into international contexts in an environment where the stakes are not massive and 
the general attitude positive because it is directed towards mutual development. 
This aspect of mutual learning is doubly important because the expansion of 
experience gained by attempting to transfer elements of the Brazilian programs 
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abroad offers a valuable critical evaluation loop, requiring a questioning of how 
things are done as they are moved to another developing society context.  
 
Conclusions  
Although a genuine desire to contribute to global development does underpin 
Brazilian development assistance provision, it is far from a completely altruistic 
activity and thus free of Morgenthau’s idea of ‘aid as bribery’. The difference 
between Brazilian and DAC-member ODA is that Brazil ‘buys’ support more 
through the expression of solidarity and transfer of applied expertise than the 
provision or promise of substantive economic rents, which then opens space for 
new economic and political opportunities. In this respect Brazil has neatly 
avoided the trap of becoming over-committed or subject to exploitation for 
retained political support. Not only is the scale of the aid too small to make such 
manipulation worthwhile, the concentration on technical assistance in lieu of cash 
grants removes some of the space for aid-dependency. Indeed, the absence of 
direct cash transfers means that the technical assistance provided by Brazil 
remains remarkably free of the corruption problems that require significant 
oversight expenditure in OECD-DAC agencies. This reflects a real sense of 
partnership in the Brazilian development model, which is increasingly explicit 
that continued social and economic progress in Brazil will not be possible if 
neighbouring countries and the wider global South do not grow too. Brazil’s self-
serving economic and political interests remain a primary motivator, but are 
cleverly expressed in a more inclusive and gentler manner. 
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The Brazilian case outlined here points to four areas for further research and 
consideration. First, the Brazilian case raises some difficult questions about how 
ODA is conceptualized and delivered, particularly with respect to DAC-member 
states widespread use of consultants and contractors. Part of the critique delivered 
by figures such as Moyo and Easterly is that ODA has become a multi-billion 
dollar business where the contractors are also the chief government lobbyists and 
critics. Brazil’s ODA practice raises the difficult question of where the relevant 
expertise can be found. Is a DAC-country consultant as well placed to deliver 
effective programming as a bureaucrat or social entrepreneur from a successful 
emerging market? Should a country like Brazil be making greater use of external 
consultants to provide ODA? If some of the most relevant expertise is to be found 
within developing countries, this in turn points to hard managerial questions about 
the management of trilateral programming, something that has proven difficult for 
almost all players involved due to the exigencies of internal accountability 
structures.  
 
A second area for further research is an examination of the effectiveness of 
Brazilian programming. The belief often expressed in the receiving countries is 
that the sort of South-South technical cooperation provided by Brazil is in some 
ways more useful than traditional ODA because it represents a real training and 
learning program, not a simple transfer of a project and temporary relocation of 
expertise. An additional argument from the Brazilian side is that they are more 
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proficient at this sort of approach because of cultural similarities and a greater 
familiarity with environments where the informal norms can matter as much as 
the formal rules. This may be the case, but it remains to be tested through detailed 
case studies.  
 
A third area calling for further research is the interplay between the activities and 
needs of Brazilian multinational corporations and the foreign policy and ODA 
initiatives of the Brazilian government. There is an emerging business studies and 
international political economy scholarship on state-firm relations in Brazil, but to 
date this has focused on the domestic side rather than specific investigations of 
how exactly Brazilian firms are being assisted with their outward expansion. As 
this paper argues, there appears to be substance to the claims that the Brazilian 
government and firms are taking a different approach to developing markets, but 
further research is needed to test how deep this commitment runs. The related 
question is the extent to which efforts are coordinated and how larger strategic 
engagement questions are managed. Focusing more on questions of development, 
the findings from an expansion of this research agenda might open new ways of 
approaching the policy coherent approach to development conundrum captured in 
the Commitment to Development Index.  
 
The final question is the obvious, but often overlooked one of how deep does 
Brazil’s commitment to ODA provision run? Under Lula the push was strong, but 
early indications from Dilma are that presidential interest is flagging and that 
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attention is being refocused inwards at Brazil’s still significant challenges. With 
foreign policy questions drawing little political and public attention in Brazil, the 
driving question is what will continue to motivate Brazil to provide ODA, 
particularly with ABC firmly encased within Itamaraty as a questionable career 
option for ambitious diplomats. The answer to this question probably rests in a 
return to the third area raised in this conclusion, namely business-government 
relations and the outward expansion of the Brazilian economy. Ultimately, this 
suggests that while the rhetoric, form, and delivery of Brazilian ODA bears 
considerable differences from that of DAC-member states, the underlying 
motivations are still remarkably similar. 
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